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Easy Cases, Bad Law, and Burdens of Proof
Roger B. Dworkin*
I may be wrong, I sometimes am, but I never doubt.
Jessel, M.R., quoted in R. MEGARRY, MISCELLANY AT LAW 8 (1955).
Easy cases, as well as hard ones, sometimes make bad law. Pickett
v. Cooper,' for example, was a straightforward automobile accident
personal injury case. Defendant's car, on the wrong side of the road,
collided with the car in which plaintiff was riding. Defendant contended
that a tire blowout, rather than negligent driving, caused his car to be
in the wrong lane, and he introduced evidence to support that conten-
tion. Instructing on the doctrine of "sudden emergency," the trial court
told the jury to find for defendant if they believed "it [to be] as likely
as not" that a tire blowout produced an emergency that was not defen-
dant's fault, during which defendant operated his car as a reasonable
person in the circumstances. The jury returned a verdict for defendant;
the court entered judgment on it; and plaintiff appealed. The Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals reversed for error in the instruction, stating
that the phrase "as likely as not" is "inapt and incorrect" in an instruc-
tion on burden of proof.
In this instance. . . [the phrase] placed the burden on the wrong party and in effect
required the plaintiff to prove that the tire did not blow out. It was defendant's
burden to explain the presence of his automobile on the wrong side of the road.
The fact that it was there made a prima facie case of negligence for the plaintiff.
The burden was then on the defendant to produce evidence to show why it was
there. His evidence was that his tire blew out, creating an emergency and causing
him to lose control. If the jury could reasonably believe from his evidence that the
tire did blow out and create the emergency claimed by the defendant, the burden
then was on the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the whole evidence that
there was negligence on the part of the defendant which was a proximate cause of
her injuries.2
In other words, the instruction was wrong because it placed the
burden of persuasion on the issue of negligence on the plaintiff when,
in fact, that burden should have been placed on the plaintiff! Since the
paraphrased holding reads like a typographical error, the contradiction
inherent in the court's position should be clear.
Extensive criticism of Pickett is neither necessary nor fair, for the
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. A.B., 1963, Princeton
University; J.D. 1966, Stanford University.
1. 202 Va. 60, 116 S.E.2d 48 (1960). For a companion case see Cooper v. Pickett, 202 Va.
65, 116 S.E.2d 52 (1960).
2. 202 Va. at 63, 116 S.E.2d at 51.
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Virginia court is far from alone in its total lack of understanding of the
concept of burden of proof. Indeed, understanding has not progressed
far since Thayer suggested that someone explain the entire subject of
burdens of proof and then decided not to do it himself.3 Some of the
legion of cases demonstrating this confusion will be encountered by the
reader of this essay. Pickett is only a particularly obvious example.4
Writers on this subject and the related one of presumptions long have
recognized the existence of this confusion, 5 but have been unable to
remove the fog, despite substantial efforts at clarification.
One possible explanation for this lack of progress is that later
writers have eschewed-as do I-any pretense of doing the job Thayer
suggested. Another possibility, the one I shall explore, is that the job
cannot be done, not because it is so large and difficult,7 but because it
3. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 354 (1898)
[hereinafter cited as THAYER].
4. For another see Waco Transit Corp. v. Resvanis, 364 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
"'The burden was upon each of the parties to prove their claim to the right-of-way, and until this
was done no subsidiary issues could be submitted.'" Id. at 303, quoting Pressler v. Moody, 233
S.W.2d 165, 166 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
5. See, e.g., Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 481, 491, 498-
505 (1946); Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 255 (1937) ("Every writer of sufficient
intelligence to appreciate the difficulties of the subject-matter has approached the topic of presump-
tions with a sense of hopelessness and has left it with a feeling of despair."); Roberts, An Introduc-
tion to the Study of Presumptions, 4 VILL. L. REV. 1, 22-29 (1958); Note, The Effect of a
Rebuttable Presumption in Montana, 31 MONT. L. REV. 97 (1969).
6. Morgan's dismay, as reflected in the language quoted in note 5 supra, is understood
readily by tracing his valuable writings on the subject of burdens and presumptions through stages
of creative excellence, compromise, and eventually capitulation as he strove first to achieve under-
standing and later mere conformity and ease of application. See Morgan, Some Observations
Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REV. 906 (1931); Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon
Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L. REV. 59 (1933); Morgan, Presumptions, 12
WASH. L. REV. 255 (1937); Morgan, Techniques in the Use of Presumptions, 24 IOWA L. REV.
413 (1939); Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 S. CAL. L. REV. 245 (1943);
Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 481, 491-505 (1946); Morgan,
Burden of Proof and Presumptions in Will Contests in Tennessee, 5 VAND. L. REV. 74 ( 1951);
Morgan, Presumptions, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 512 (1956). See also E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS
OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 70-105 (1956).
Many other writers have contributed to the effort to unravel the mysteries of burdens and
presumptions. I have found the contributions of Dean Gausewitz and Professor Cleary particularly
useful. See Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV.
5 (1959); Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. REV. 391 (1956); Gausewitz, Presumptions in a
One-Rule World, 5 VAND. L. REV. 324 (1952).
7. In conventional terms the job is large and difficult indeed. Since every case involves
burdens of proof, full explication of the subject as traditionally conceived would be the work of
several lifetimes. My very different purpose here is to make an unconventional proposal, which is
no less tentative for being bluntly stated, in the hope that my position may help to reorient the
way we look at burdens of proof and lead to further inquiry.
In order to avoid constitutional problems, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof
beyond reasonable doubt constitutionally required to establish guilt in a criminal trial), and digres-
sions from the central focus, discussion here will involve the burden of proof only in civil cases
and will mention the criminal law only in passing.
BURDENS OF PROOF
is so small-some would say elusive-that it presents the same frustra-
tions as searching for a needle in a haystack. Indeed, I shall push my
mixed metaphor further and suggest that no needle is in the haystack,
which, of course, is why no one can find it. The concept of burden of
proof exists on a theoretical level because we believe it does. On a
functional level, I shall argue that the concept does not do what it is
supposed to do, but does do something else. Further, what it does is bad.
Since it performs a bad function unrelated to its theoretical purpose,
does not perform its supposed function, and badly confuses the law, we
should abandon the entire notion of the burden of proof in order to
simplify the law, stop fooling ourselves, and remove a misused tool from
the hands of appellate judges.
I. THE BURDEN OF PROOF CONCEPT
Simply stated, the burden of proof is the obligation of a party to
demonstrate the existence of facts that have a desired legal consequence.
Everyone now recognizes that the term "burden of proof" is ambiguous
because it embraces at least two different obligations. The first of these
is the obligation to present sufficient evidence to permit the trier of fact
to find for the obligated party on the issue in question. Whether this
obligation has been satisfied is a question of law and is therefore deter-
mined by the judge, usually on a motion for directed verdict. Modern
terminology refers to this burden as the burden of producing evidence.
The second obligation to which the term burden of proof applies is
the obligation to persuade the trier of fact to find for the obligated party
on the issue in question. The trier may be permitted to find for a party
and not actually do so. The obligation to persuade thus may be more
onerous than the obligation imposed by the burden of producing evi-
dence. This obligation to persuade is generally referred to simply as the
burden of persuasion.8
On each issue in a case some party must carry the burden of pro-
ducing evidence or lose at the hands of the judge, and some party must
carry the burden of persuasion or lose at the hands of the jury. Despite
the different decision points and decision makers, however, the two
burdens are not really very dissimilar. Since the jury theoretically
8. Some writers prefer the term "risk of non-persuasion" as more expressive of the fact that
adverse consequences flow from the failure to persuade. This longer term seems to me without
advantage, and in an already confused area, much can be said for terminological simplification.
Fortunately, I do not believe that anyone yet advocates calling the burden of producing evidence
the "risk of failing to produce evidence," although that would be just as logical as using the "risk
of non-persuasion" language.
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weighs only the evidence-and not, for example, the arguments of coun-
sel-in reaching its decision, a party carries the burden of persuasion
the same way he carries the burden of producing evidence-by introduc-
ing evidence. The same amount of evidence may carry both burdens, or
more may be required to persuade the jury than to avoid an adverse
peremptory ruling from the judge. As a practical matter, of course, any
attorney will present as much favorable evidence as he can on every
issue unless some of the evidence will prove detrimental to his client on
some other issue or in a way not involved in the trial at hand. Because
the two burdens are carried in the same way, both in theory and in fact,
the advocate is apt to treat them identically.
Moreover, the standard applied in deciding whether a party has
carried his burden of producing evidence is determined by the standard
to be applied in deciding whether he has carried his burden of persua-
sion. Thus, in a typical civil case, plaintiff is required to prove the
elements of his case by a preponderance of the evidence. As frequently
stated, he must convince the jury that his contention is more likely than
not. In deciding whether to let the case go to the jury, the question for
the trial judge is whether a reasonable jury could find that plaintiff's
contention is more likely than not In a criminal case, in which the jury
must be persuaded of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the
judge will direct a verdict for a defendant or grant his motion for judg-
ment of acquittal' unless the judge believes a reasonable jury could find
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. As Professor McNaughton
has put it, the burden of producing evidence is a function of the burden
of persuasion." Most importantly, the two burdens are designed to do
the same thing-to determine the outcome of litigation in the event of
a failure of proof. Studying the two parts of the burden of proof together
thus has some utility, as long as one remembers the analytical distinc-
tion between them. 12
The notion that proof is a burden is relatively recent. Originally,
the opportunity to prove one's case was considered a benefit because the
person who successfully made the proof won the case; accordingly, the
chance to do so was a valuable right. 3 Indeed, Pollock and Maitland
9. Hart & McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, in EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE
48, 53 (D. Lerner ed. 1958).
10. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.
11. McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a Burden of Persuasion,
68 HARV. L. REV. 1382 (1955).
12. In this paper the term "burden of proof" will be used (1) when matters common to the
2 included burdens are being discussed and (2) when a case under discussion uses that term and
understanding of the case requires that I use it also.
13. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 81, 107 (3d ed. 1923) thereinafter
cited as HOLDSWORTH].
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discuss early English judges "awarding" the proof" and note that de-
fendants wanted to make proof rather than allow their opponents to do
so.' " Early procedures reinforced the universal human desire to be per-
mitted to tell one's own side of a story by giving real advantage to the
party who was put to the proof.
First, in order even to have his claim considered, the plaintiff had
to offer to prove it. I" The defendant not only would deny plaintiff's
accusations, but also offer to prove the truth of his denial. I7 The judge
could award either party one of several available types of proof. If he
did not choose proof by battle, which required each party to contribute
to the proof, the judge improved the "burdened" party's chances of
winning by assigning the proof to him. At first blush this may seem a
strange statement to a generation of persons unlikely to fight for the
privilege of carrying the red hot iron, but the little evidence we have on
the point suggests that there was at least a 50 percent chance of vindica-
tion, even for the party "awarded" this type of proof. 8 For other modes
of proof the advantages are clearer. The defendant might be awarded
proof by oath, for example, sometimes being allowed to prevail upon
his oath alone, but more frequently being required to present several
oath helpers to swear that his oath was true. Originally, these oath
helpers had to be relatives of the defendant. 9 Even later, when kinship
was no longer required, it is not hard to understand why a defendant
would want to be put to his proof if that meant merely choosing friends
and neighbors to swear on his behalf. The advantage to a defendant
became even clearer by the thirteenth century when a mode of proof
open to plaintiffs was the production of a "suit" of "witnesses" who
"proved" plaintiff's case by swearing an assertory oath in support of
plaintiff's own oath.21 If the case is to be decided on the oaths of one
party and his friends and neighbors, each party surely will want to.be
the one called upon to prove his case.
As the short-lived 21 trial by witnesses developed, each party began
producing witnesses, and the judge decided the case by choosing which
set of witnesses to believe. He made this decision, however, based upon
the number of witnesses produced by each party and the consistency of
14. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 601 (2d ed. 1898,
reissued 1968) [hereinafter cited as POLLOCK & MAITLAND].
15. Id. at 610.
16. Id. at 605-06.
17. Id. at 610.
18. Id. at 599 & nn.1 & 2.
19. Id. at 600.
20. See id. at 601.
21. See I HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 302-05.
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their stories rather than on an evaluation of the probable truth of the
stories told. If plaintiff produced three consistent witnesses and defen-
dant two, plaintiff would win. If, on the other hand, the story of one of
plaintiff's witnesses was inconsistent with that of the other two, the
inconsistency permitted defendant to prevail. 2 Who won in the event
that each party produced the same number of consistent witnesses is
unclear.
The device that triumphed over trial by witnesses, of course, was
trial by jury. At first any notion of burden of proof was irrelevant to
trial by jury because the jurors found information on their own and
simply answered a formal question presented to them by the court. 2
Only gradually did the jury lose its character as an investigating and
witnessing body; it did not become solely a judging body until late in
the seventeenth century.24 The modern concept of burden of proof grew
up as the jury slowly shaped itself into the fact-finding, law-applying
body we have today.
Even under the relatively modern procedure of the middle and late
nineteenth century, the burden of proof was not viewed as particularly
burdensome. Litigants regularly fought to obtain the right to open and
close the presentation of proof, a right that accompanied the burden of
proof.25 Thus, we see parties struggling to have the burden of proof
imposed not on their opponents, but on themselves. In an Indiana case
the court noted that it was "not improbable" that both sides made
efforts to frame their pleadings to obtain the right of opening and clos-
ing, regardless of the burden assumed.26 And in England the judges of
the Queen's Bench worried about a rule permitting a defendant to open
when his answer was a confession and avoidance, because the defendant
might abuse the privilege by confessing the case against him and affirm-
ing as a defense something he knew to be false for the purpose of
securing the right to beginY.2 Apparently, nineteenth century practition-
ers thought the burden of having to prove their case was slight when
compared to the tactical benefit of being permitted to open and close.
Eventually, of course, fairly clear rules emerged to govern who
could open and close different types of cases. Thus, by 1833 it was clear
22. Id. at 302-03.
23. For good accounts of the early history of trial by jury see id. at 312-50; 1 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 14, at 138-50.
24. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 319, 332-37.
25. See Judah v. Trustees of Vincennes University, 23 Ind. 272 (1864); McLees v. Felt, II
Ind. 218 (1858).
26. Judah v. Trustees of Vincennes University, 23 Ind. 272, 279 (1864).
27. Mercer v. Whall, 114 Eng. Rep. 1318 (Q.B. 1845).
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in all actions for personal injury, libel, and slander that plaintiff could
begin even though defendant admitted plaintiff's allegations and
pleaded only an affirmative defense which, of course, the defendant had
to prove.28 By 1845, the same rule applied to actions on contract. 9 As
these rules solidified, the benefit of being able to open and close, which
had been an automatic incident of the burden of proof, became largely
independent of it. With neither this benefit nor the advantages available
to the proving party under early English procedure, litigants no longer
had any incentive to obtain the burden of proof. Burden of proof litiga-
tion instead became a struggle to place the burden on the opposing
party.
The vigor with which burden of proof battles have been fought ever
since suggests that matters of the highest importance are at stake. Re-
membering our nineteenth century predecessors' willing acceptance of
the burden in exchange for the opportunity to address the trier first may
serve to keep the modern conflict in perspective.
II. THE MODERN UNDERSTANDING
James Bradley Thayer set the confines of contemporary burden of
proof analysis in a brilliant treatment that described the burden of
persuasion, the burden of producing evidence, and the difference be-
tween them. 3 This difference could not very well have been understood
much before Thayer's time. The distinction is not an inevitable compo-
nent of the notion of burden of proof; rather, it is largely a function of
peremptory ruling practice, which emerged at about the same time that
the focus of litigation was shifting from attempts to obtain the right to
open and close to attempts to avoid the obligation to prove one's case.3 1
Only with the advent of peremptory ruling practice did it make sense
to consider a burden of producing evidence apart from the burden of
persuasion or, as it had previously been called without confusion, the
burden of proof. The possibility of a peremptory ruling added a new
decision point to the trial of a case. Now, for the first time, a burdened
party had to present evidence to persuade two different triers-judge
and jury-at two different times-motion for peremptory ruling and
28. Carter v. Jones, 172 Eng. Rep. 1147 (Nisi Prius 1833).
29. Mercer v. Whall, 114 Eng. Rep. 1318 (Q.B. 1845).
30. THAYER, supra note 3, at 355-59. Wigmore adopted, expanded, and disseminated
Thayer's analysis, thereby making it the standard view. See generally 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
266-86 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
31. See Reaugh, Presumptions and the Burden of Proof 36 ILL. L. REV. 703, 706 (1942).
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deliberation after submission of the case-of two different, but re-
lated,32 things-that the jury reasonably could find for the party and
that it should find for him. Thayer made clear the existence of these
different decision points, decision makers, and issues. Unfortunately, he
did not make clear the importance of his analytical distinction or the
functional significance of the two burdens. He did, however, spell out
different rules governing the actions of the two burdens. These rules and
the debates they have engendered are in large part responsible for the
confusion that now surrounds the entire subject of burdens of proof.3
Thayer apparently accepted without question the need for a burden
of proof concept. Certainly later writers have treated the burden of
proof as an obvious requisite of a civilized dispute resolution system. 34
After all, they note, each party wants to know what facts he must
prove,35 and the fact finder must know what to do when his mind is in
a state of equilibrium. 36 Moreover, the adversary nature of our system
makes the assignment of burdens essential because the court conducts
no investigation of its own and relies wholly on the parties for informa-
tion. Some party must be forced to satisfy the court's curiosity.
However convincing or unconvincing these reasons may be, they
plainly are not only part of the contemporary understanding of burdens
of proof but also rationalizations for the premise that underlies it. Spe-
cific rules about burdens of proof developed in a context that accepted
the need for burdens and assumed that the burdens would inform parties
of what they had to prove, provide a cure for indecisive decision makers,
and force litigants to produce evidence in court.
The burden of producing evidence was designed to serve the last
purpose. It tells us who, if anyone, will win on an issue if no evidence
or no more evidence is introduced. Thus it is supposed to goad the party
who would lose without the introduction of any or further evidence into
offering some. The thought seems to be that an automobile accident
32. See text accompanying notes 8-11 supra.
33. See, e.g., text accompanying notes I & 2 supra. The Virginia court in Pickett v. Cooper
knew, as does every law student, that it was supposed to distinguish between the burden of
persuasion and the burden of producing evidence. Also, like most law students, it had not the
vaguest notion what the significance of the distinction was or of how to deal with it; the result was
a ridiculous opinion.
34. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 249 (1965); McBaine, Burden of Proof- Degrees of Belief,
32 CALIF. L. RaV. 242, 242-43 (1944); Michael & Adler, The Trial of an Issue of Fact, 34 COLUM.
L. REV. 1224, 1251 (1934); Morgan, Presumptions, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 512, 520-21 (1956).
35. 9 WIGMORE, supra note 30, at 274.
36. McBaine, supra note 34, at 243. See Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59
HARV. L. REV. 481, 492 (1946).
37. Morgan, supra note 36, at 491-92; Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presump-
tions, 44 HARV. L. REV. 906, 910-11 (1931).
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victim who thinks the accident was someone else's fault, consults an
attorney about the matter, brings a lawsuit, and appears for trial will
not introduce evidence of the other party's negligence 'unless forced to
do so by having a legal burden imposed upon him-a silly notion, and
only theoretically a harmless one because it may make lawyers' tactical
misjudgments unrelated to the merits of the case determinative. More-
over, the burden of producing evidence is not even well designed to
achieve the objective of having further evidence offered at trial. Even if
one assumes that parties willingly will withhold helpful evidence, the
way to force them to produce it is to impose the sanction of defeat only
for nonproduction of evidence caused by purposeful withholding or ac-
tual unavailability. If maximum evidentiary production is the goal, the
motion for directed verdict should be replaced by a motion to produce
more evidence. The party against whom an order to produce is issued
could either reopen and present additional information or refuse to
reopen and lose the case. The burden of producing evidence and peremp-
tory ruling practices, however, force a party to gamble on the sufficiency
of his evidence and impose the sanction of defeat for a wrong guess
regardless of the probability that his position on the merits is correct.
Present law provides no second chances.
No one seems to have trouble understanding that the burden of
producing evidence on one issue may shift from party to party as the
case progresses." A plaintiff initially will be required to produce evi-
dence of defendant's negligence in an action for negligent tort. At some
point he may have introduced so much evidence, of such convincing
force, that the defendant must offer conflicting evidence or lose on the
issue of his negligence. As a practical matter, once reasonable men may
find defendant negligent, he should introduce evidence to show he was
not negligent or run the risk of incurring liability. As a legal matter,
once reasonable men must find defendant negligent, he must introduce
evidence to show he was not negligent, or liability will be imposed,
absent some limiting factor like contributory negligence. At that point,
the burden of producing evidence on the issue of negligence has shifted
to the defendant. Conceivably, the defendant could shift the burden of
producing evidence back onto the plaintiff by introducing overwhelm-
ingly probative evidence that he was not negligent. Thus, as everyone
agrees, the burden of producing evidence may shift back and forth
throughout the trial. 9 Eventually, each party may be in a position to
38. THAYER, supra note 3, at 370; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 30, at 285-86.
39. There is another sense in which one might say that the burden of producing evidence
shifts: once plaintiff has satisfied the burden of producing evidence of all the elements of his prima
facie case, defendant has the burden of producing evidence of any affirmative defenses he wants
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avoid a peremptory ruling on the issue in question. At that point the
burden of producing evidence disappears and the burden of persuasion
becomes relevant.
The burden of persuasion is supposed to tell the trier of fact what
outcome to reach when a decision based on mental conviction is impos-
sible.4 On most issues in a civil lawsuit the burdened party must prove
his case by a preponderance of the evidence; on a few issues the civil
burden is described as clear and convincing evidence;41 and in criminal
cases the prosecution must prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt.42 In all cases, of course, the question is really whether the
trier of fact is in doubt and whether that doubt is reasonable. If degrees
of doubt exist, the more serious the consequences of an adverse deci-
sion on the unburdened party are, the smaller is the amount of uncer-
tainty in the trier's mind needed to constitute "reasonable doubt."43
Thus what different burden of persuasion standards in different types
of cases really attempt is to define the degree of doubt the trier may have
and still find for the burdened party. That they are ill designed to
achieve this purpose is clear. Nonetheless, everyone understands that a
plaintiff may win a civil case even though the trier's mind is in great
doubt, but the prosecution may not win a criminal case unless the trier's
doubt is reduced substantially.
Litigation regarding the burden of persuasion ostensibly does not
involve judicial determination whether a party has carried his burden
because theoretically only the jury can determine that. Appellate opin-
ions talking about burden of proof in the context of whether a party's
evidence is sufficient are always talking about the burden of producing
evidence. The question is whether the trial judge erred in permitting the
case to go to the jury, not whether the jury was too easily persuaded.
Burden of persuasion cases almost always arise in the context of an
asserted error in the trial judge's instructions. The error may be of one
considered. It is now defendant's turn to present evidence or have issues like contributory negli-
gence dropped from the case. Thus the burden of producing evidence has shifted from plaintiff to
defendant, not on one issue, but in terms of preserving different issues for consideration.
40. See McCormick, What Shall the Trial Judge Tell the Jury About Presumptions?, 13
WASH. L. REV. 185, 190-91 (1938), in SELECTED WRITINGS ON EVIDENCE AND TRIAL 1010, 1014-
15 (1957).
41. The standard "clear and convincing proof" is applied to determine, for example, the
proof necessary for a charge of fraud and undue influence. 9 WIGMORE, supra note 30, at 329-34.
42. The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is constitutionally compelled in criminal cases
and juvenile delinquency proceedings in which a juvenile is charged with conduct that would be
criminal if committed by an adult. Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (per curiam);
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
43. See Hart & McNaughton, supra note 9, at 54-55; Comment, Evidence: The Validity of
Multiple Standards of Proof, 1959 Wis. L. REV. 525, 540.
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of three kinds: the trial judge imposed too heavy or too light a burden
on a party; the trial judge imposed the burden of persuasion on the
wrong party; or having once imposed the burden of persuasion on the
right party, the trial judge erroneously allowed the burden of persuasion
to be shifted to the other party.
Litigation of these issues is continual and voluminous; we shall
examine a few cases when they become relevant. For now, it would be
too flippant to state that there is no modern understanding of the burden
of persuasion, for certain articulable dogmas exist even though, as noted
above,4 at least part of the modern understanding is that no one under-
stands. For our purposes, the assignment and especially the shifting of
the burden of persuasion are of primary importance.
Several tests for the allocation of the burden of persuasion have
been in favor from time to time." One approach holds that the burden
of persuasion rests on the party asserting the affirmative of the issue,
but this is obviously unsatisfactory as a guide because any proposition
can be stated affirmatively or negatively with fair ease. Similarly, the
suggestion that the party to whose case proof of the issue is essential
must bear the burden is worthless because it begs the crucial question:
To whose case is the proof essential? Likewise, to say that the burden
of persuasion follows the burden of pleading tells nothing about how to
decide on whom the latter burden rests. Placing the burden of persua-
sion on the party with better access to the evidence obviously is not the
general test because, for example, plaintiffs must prove defendants'
negligence and vice versa. Nevertheless, this factor may sometimes be
relevant in determining burden placement, as may the extent to which
one party's contention departs from the ordinarily expectable. None of
the simple tests controls the question of who has the burden of persua-
sion. Instead, substantive considerations-questions of policy and fair-
ness-are determinative, and they, of course, will differ from case to
case.
Despite the obvious impossibility of determining in advance the
dictates of policy and fairness for all cases of one broad category, rules
of burden of persuasion allocation are viewed as fairly inflexible. Most
lawyers believe, for example, that once the substantive decision to re-
quire plaintiffs to prove defendants' negligence has been made, a reex-
amination of this decision on a case-by-case basis is unlikely. Thus the
44. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
45. The capsule summary and criticisms in the text following this note are taken largely from
the following sources: F. JAMES, supra note 34, at 255-58; E. MORGAN, supra note 6, at 75-76; 9
WIGMORE, supra note 30, at 274-78; Cleary, supra note 6, at 11-13.
1972] 1161
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
popular conception still seems to be that the burden of persuasion never
shifts; it is allocated in advance to one party, and it stays with him
throughout the trial.
Massachusetts' Chief Justice Shaw, writing in Powers v. Russell,"
apparently is responsible for first stating that the burden of persuasion
never shifts.47 In the course of deciding to dismiss plaintiff's bill in equity
to redeem real estate, Chief Justice Shaw wrote:
It was stated here that the plaintiff had made out a primafacie case, and, therefore,
the burden of proof was shifted and placed upon the defendant. In a certain sense
this is true. Where the party having the burden of proof establishes a primafacie
case, and no proof to the contrary is offered, he will prevail. Therefore, the other
party, if he would avoid the effect of such prima facie case, must produce evidence,
of equal or greater weight, to balance or control it, or he will fail. Still the proof
upon both sides applies to the affirmative or negative of one and the same issue,
or proposition of fact; and the party whose case requires the proof of that fact, has
all along the burden of proof. It does not shift, though the weight in either scale
may at times preponderate.
But where the party having the burden of proof gives competent and prima
facie evidence of a fact, and the adverse party, instead of producing proof which
would go to negative the same proposition of fact, proposes to show another and a
Aistinct proposition which avoids the effect of it, there the burden of proof shifts,
and rests upon the party proposing to show the latter fact."8
Although Shaw's 1832 language may sound imprecise, the in-
tended meaning is clear. Once a party makes out a prima facie case
on an issue, his opponent must offer some contrary evidence on that
issue or lose. As a practical matter, the burden of producing evidence
has shifted to him. Indeed, Powers may be read to suggest that the
burden of producing evidence has shifted as a legal as well as a
practical matter. The correctness of that reading depends upon
one's understanding of the term "prima facie case," a definitional
problem that fortunately is irrelevant for present purposes. As Chief
Justice Shaw pointed out, however, the "burden of proof"-by
which he obviously meant what we now call the burden of persuasion,
since he contrasted it with the weight of the evidence-does not
shift, but stays "all along" on the party who made out the prima
facie case. When a defendant wishes to assert an affirmative defense,
he must prove it, and accordingly, the burden of proof shifts to
him. This is merely a clumsy way of saying that different parties
must prove different issues and is in no way a surprising statement.
Thus, Powers v. Russell presents three different burdens of proof: what
we call the burden of producing evidence, which shifts from party to
party during the trial; what we call the burden of persuasion, which
46. 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 69 (1832).
47. See Reaugh, supra note 31, at 708-10.
48. 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) at 76-77.
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never shifts; and the burden on the defendant to establish affirmative
defenses. 9
Thayer adopted and thereby assured the contiruing vitality of
Shaw's assertion that the burden of persuasion never shifts." More
recently, Wigmore took the same position in most definite terms:
The first burden above described-the risk of non-persuasion of the jury-never
shifts, since no fixed rule of law can be said to shift. The law of pleading, or, within
the stage of a given pleading, some further rule of practice, fixes beforehand the
issuable facts respectively apportioned to the case of each party; each party may
know beforehand, from these rules, what facts will be a part of his case, so far as
concerns the ultimate risk of non-persuasion. He will know from these rules that
such facts, whenever the time comes, will be his to prove, and not the other party's;
and that they will not be sometimes his and sometimes the other's, or possibly his
and possibly the other's. . . . [T]he putting-in of evidence may. . . "shift" in the
sense that each will take his turn in proving the respective propositions apportioned
to him. But the burden does not "shift" in any real sense; for each may once for
all ascertain beforehand from rules of law the 'facta probanda' apportioned to him,
and this apportionment will always remain as thus fixed, to whatever stage the
cause may progress.5"
Other writers have continued to assert as undeniable truth that the
burden of persuasion never shifts."2 One has even suggested calling the
burden of persuasion the "fixed burden of proof" to emphasize "the
vital distinguishing feature" of the burden.13 And some who recognize
the controversial nature of the assertion that the burden of persuasion
never shifts are willing to argue not for the mere existence but for the
wisdom of the rule.54
Although the view that the burden of persuasion never shifts is not
unanimously held, it is dominant at present. Most suggestions to the
contrary have been restricted to arguments over the effect of presump-
tions." Thus the modern understanding is that the burden of persuasion
49. This burden, too, is susceptible to division into a burden of producing evidence and a
burden of persuasion.
50. THAYER, supra note 3, at 369-70.
5I. 9 WIGMORE, supra note 30, at 285. Wigmore, of course, recognized that the burden of
producing evidence, as well as "the putting-in of evidence," does shift. Id. at 285-86.
52. Bridge, Presumptions and Burdens, 12 MOD. L. REV. 273, 274 (1949); Hanbury, The
Burden of Proof 61 JURID. REV. 121, 124-27, 132 (1949); Laughlin, The Location of the Burden
of Persuasion, 18 U. Prrr. L. REV. 3, 24-26 (1956); Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of
Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REV. 195, 200-01 (1953); Stone, Burden of Proof and the Judicial
Process: A Commentary on Joseph Constantine Steamship, Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corpora-
tion. Ltd., 60 L.Q. REV. 262, 262-70 (1944).
53. Bridge, supra note 52, at 274.
54. Laughlin, supra note 52 (both articles); Ray, Presumptions and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 588 (1955); Comment, Presumptions-The Uniform Rules in the
Federal Courts, 1964 DUKE L.J. 867, 883-87.
55. See, e.g., Keeton, Statutory Presumptions-Their Constitutionality and Legal Effect, 10
TEXAs L. REV. 34, 46-47 (1931); Morgan, Instructing the Jury upon Presumptions and Burden of
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is a fixed rule of law that is to be imposed permanently on a party before
the trial starts according to one or a combination of unsatisfactory
formulae to enable the jury to decide cases in which the jurors cannot
decide which set of factual representations is correct. In the rest of this
Article, I shall argue that this conception is incorrect, attempt to correct
it, and then evaluate the burden of proof in the context of the corrected
understanding.
III. USES OF THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION
A. An Aid to Decision Making
As we have seen, the modern understanding of the function of the
burden of persuasion is that it makes possible the decision of cases that
the trier of fact could not otherwise decide. The trier of fact in this
context is always an individual. The jury or, in nonjury cases, the judge,
decides issues of fact. In jury cases, however, the parties are entitled to
the independent opinion of each juror, which is then expressed in the
verdict of the jury as an entity. 6 Thus, when we say the plaintiff must
prove the defendant's negligence by a preponderance of the evidence,
what we mean is that in order for the jury to return a verdict for the
plaintiff, each of the required number of jurors must individually find
that it is more likely than not that defendant was negligent. If any juror
cannot decide whether defendant's negligence or nonnegligence is more
likely, he must vote for defendant. Thus, in a state requiring unanimity
for civil verdicts, eleven jurors may believe absolutely that defendant
was negligent, but be precluded from returning a verdict for plaintiff
either by the remaining juror's contrary conviction or by his inability
to decide. A hung jury is no evidence of the working of the burden of
persuasion.
The more-probable-than-not standard and the requirement that
each juror be persuaded to the requisite degree combine with certain
psychological realities to make the burden of persuasion essentially
useless as an aid to decision making.
First, even in theory, the burden of persuasion only applies when
the fact finder's mind is in a state of complete equilibrium. Because the
fact finder will always have been presented with evidence by skilled
advocates of interested parties, the likelihood of his real indecision is
small indeed, even apart from psychological factors.5 1
Proof, 47 HARV. L. REV. 59, 79 (1933); Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions,
44 HARV. L. REV. 906, 911-12 (1931).
56. E. MORGAN, supra note 6, at 74; see, e.g., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL
[BAJI] No. 15.30 (5th rev. ed. 1969); cf ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL No. 1.05 (1961).
57. See Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARV. L. REV. 153, 185, 191 (1944);
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Secondly, even though the applicability of the burden of persuasion
standard to the state of mind of twelve different persons rather than one
entity may at first blush seem to increase the likelihood that allocation
of the burden affects the fact finder's decision, actually it decreases that
probability. It is easy enough to imagine a body of twelve persons
unable to decide an issue. If the burden of persuasion applied to the jury
rather than to the jurors, a six-to-six deadlock resulting in a verdict for
the unburdened party might occur frequently. However, as anyone who
has ever served on a committee knows, the group may well remain
deadlocked long after each of its members has made up his mind. Indi-
vidual decision making, even in the face of argumentation, is much
easier than group decision making.
Thirdly, a number of psychological and quasi-psychological forces
operate to make juror indecision extremely unlikely. In considering
these forces, one must remember the distinction between true indecision
and stated indecision. A person who is not really undecided may state
that he is for a variety of reasons. Thus we must examine both true and
stated indecision in the trial context if we are further to evaluate the
burden of persuasion as an aid to decision making.
Jury verdicts result in important consequences to real persons or
other entities in disputes that frequently have implications beyond the
immediate litigation. Anyone intelligent enough to be a juror knows
this, and even the trappings of the courtroom setting are designed in part
to enhance this awareness. Jurors, like everyone else, have a sense of
justice-of the way things ought to be-and bring that sense to the trial
of a case along with a full set of human prejudices and considerable
information and misinformation. Based on what he feels, what he
thinks, and what he thinks he knows, a juror begins the decision-making
process with a sense of the utility or disutility of a given decision. 8 This
is true regardless of whether he knows the precise consequences of each
possible verdict. Thus, whether a jury member knows that defendant's
insurance company is almost certain to pay plaintiff's judgment may
affect his view of utilities, but neither his knowledge nor his ignorance
will prevent him from having a view. If he knows the defendant is
insured, he may feel either that it is better to err on the side of the
plaintiff, whose resources are almost certain to be less than the insur-
Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 S. CAL. L. REV. 245, 255 (1943). But see
Reaugh, supra note 31, at 717-18.
58. For a good discussion of one model of decision making with emphasis on the role of the
perceived disutility of a given decision see Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process,
20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968).
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ance company's, or that it is better to err on the side of the defendant,
since plaintiffs' awards in tort litigation increase everyone's insurance
premiums. What his views are is not important. What matters is that
he has some views, and that they color the way he evaluates the evi-
dence.
The juror's view of the relative disutilities of different verdicts will
combine with the evidence presented to carry the day for the party
whose victory is less unsatisfactory to the juror in those few cases in
which the evidence really would leave the mind of a truly impartial
juror-if there were such a creature-in a state of equilibrium. This
leaves open one strange possibility: Suppose the evidence objectively
favors plaintiff, but the juror's view of relative disutilities is sufficiently
strong in favor of defendant to put the juror's mind into a state of
absolute indecision. Will the placing of the burden of persuasion now
control his vote?
Theoretically, the answer is yes. In fact, however, I suspect that the
burden of persuasion is irrelevant even here. If the juror has been led
to his state of indecision by unarticulated or subconscious disutility
views, he may in effect weigh those views twice by articulating them to
himself at this point and allowing them to control his decision. If he does
that, the burden of persuasion has no impact. If he does not do that
because he realizes that he has already considered his own views of
disutility, he may concede that only those views make him unable to
decide and fall back to the objective position, which causes him to vote
for plaintiff regardless of burden of persuasion instructions. On the
other hand, if he does not weigh his disutility views twice, either because
he never becomes conscious of them or because good conscience com-
pels him not to, he will vote for the party not having the burden of
persuasion on whatever issue he cannot resolve, absent the operation of
other factors.
Of course, other factors operate on the juror, though, and reduce
still further the probability that the burden of persuasion will have
controlling importance. Although each juror is to make up his own
mind, he does so as a member of a very special group. The jurors realize
that they have been selected to decide a case. The whole trial has built
toward the group's decision; indecision would be intolerable. It would
be difficult, indeed, for a juror to accept that his decision is based only
on his own inability to decide. The members of the group have an
interest-founded on pride and a desire to go home-in making a deci-
sion. They may bring pressure to bear on fellow jurors to reach a deci-
sion. Indeed, the trial judge's instructions are designed to facilitate even
the reluctant minority juror's compliance by encouraging him not to
state a position until he has had a chance to hear how the deliberations
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are developing." If compliance is easy for the minority juror, it is the
natural course for the merely undecided one. This is untrue only when
the jury is strongly polarized. In this situation, however, the burden of
persuasion is irrelevant to the outcome because the undecided juror's
influence on the outcome is nil. The result is the same whether the jury
is split six to six, or six to five with one unable to decide."
The minute area in which the burden of persuasion even theoreti-
cally is supposed to control decision, the requirement of individual deci-
sion making by each juror, the formal context of litigation including
everything from courtroom fixtures to jury instructions, and individual
and group psychological pressures make true juror indecision a virtual
impossibility and therefore make it almost impossible for a case to arise
in which the burden of persuasion really permits a decision that other-
wise could not be made.
Does the burden of persuasion permit decision making that would
otherwise be rendered impossible by a juror's stated but not actual
inability to decide? It is easy to suppose a juror who really can decide
between two or more alternatives but who for some reason of his own
prefers to say that he has not made up or cannot make up his mind. Is
the burden of persuasion a useful device for helping him to render the
decision he prefers without having to state his true reasons? I think not.
Most obviously, the burden of persuasion is useful for such a juror
only if it lies on the party he thinks should lose. In the only instance in
which the juror can rely on the burden of persuasion, therefore, he does
so to reach the result he would reach if forced to decide without the
burden of persuasion device. If he wants the burdened party to win, the
burden of persuasion clearly is no help to him. By adding the psycholog-
ical pressures we have observed, all of which push a juror toward stating
a decision, the irrelevance of the burden of persuasion to the case of
stated indecision is clear. The burden of persuasion simply is not an aid
to jury decision making. If it has any function, we must find it some-
where outside the fact-finding context.
B. A Mask for Substantive Legal Change
In the well-known case of Summers v. Tice,61 plaintiff and the two
defendants were hunting together. Plaintiff climbed a hill, placing the
59. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL [BAJI] No. 15.31 (5th rev. ed. 1969).
60. It is true, however, that compliance is not a strong force for decision making, and
indecision may be important in jurisdictions that permit nonunanimous verdicts. If, for example,
a 9-3 vote is all that is required, the undecided juror in an 8-3-1 split is important and is not helped
much by pressures to follow the (split) group.
61. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
1972] 1167
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
parties at the points of a triangle. Defendant Tice flushed a quail that
flew between plaintiff and the two defendants. Both defendants shot in
plaintiff's direction at the quail. Two pellets hit plaintiff, one in the eye
and one in the upper lip. Plaintiff sought damages for his injuries from
both defendants. At trial, admissions by defendant Simonson to third
parties that he had fired the offending shot were introduced. Beyond
that, plaintiff was unable to prove which defendant had shot him be-
cause defendants had used shotguns of the same guage and the same size
shot. Nevertheless, the trial judge, who heard the case without a jury,
found that the shots struck plaintiff as a direct result of the shooting by
defendants; that defendants were negligent; and that plaintiff was not
contributorily negligent. He entered judgment for plaintiff against both
defendants. They appealed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of California recognized that the
major item of damage was the injury to the eye and proceeded as if only
one pellet had struck plaintiff. By doing so the court simplified analysis
without sacrificing reality. Nothing indicated that one pellet had come
from each defendant's gun, and focusing on each shot would have forced
the court to repeat its analysis with no difference in reasoning or out-
come.
The problem on appeal was obvious. Plaintiffs have the burden of
proof on the issue of cause in fact in negligence cases, and plaintiff could
not prove which defendant caused his injury. When two defendants act
together, although not necessarily in concert, and both are negligent,
may plaintiff recover despite this failure of proof? The court held that
he could and affirmed the trial court's judgment.
The court noted that the trial judge apparently did not believe
defendant Simonson's admissions. In finding that the negligence of both
defendants with the cause of plaintiff's injury "or to that legal effect,"
the lower court recognized its inability to determine which defendant
fired the crucial shot."2 On that state of the record the supreme court
refused to take the easy way out by holding that defendants had acted
in concert and therefore were joint tortfeasors. 3 Instead, the court
determined that defendants should be liable because:
To hold otherwise would be to exonerate both from liability, although each was
negligent, and the injury resulted from such negligence."
... .When we consider the relative position of the parties and the results that
would flow if plaintiff was required to pin the injury on one of the defendants only,
62. Id. at 84, 199 P.2d at 2.
63. Id. at 84-85, 199 P.2d at 3.
64. Id. at 85, 199 P.2d at 3, quoting Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 860, 110 So. 666, 668
(1926).
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a requirement that the burden of proof on that subject be shifted to defendants
becomes manifest. They are both wrongdoers-both negligent toward plaintiff.
They brought about a situation where the negligence of one of them injured the
plaintiff, hence it should rest with them each to absolve himself if he can. The
injured party has been placed by defendants in the unfair position of pointing to
which defendant caused the harm. If one can escape the other may also and plaintiff
is remediless. Ordinarily defendants are in a far better position to offer evidence
to determine which one caused the injury.65
For the same reasons, the court concluded that the burden of show-
ing any damage apportionment should rest on defendants. They will be
treated as liable "on the same basis as joint tort feasors," and for
reasons of policy "the case is based upon the legal proposition that,
under the circumstances here presented, each defendant is liable for the
whole damage whether [defendants] are deemed to be acting in concert
or independently.""6
Thus for plausible reasons of policy the court permitted plaintiff
to win a case despite his inability to prove one of the critical elements
of his cause of action simply by shifting the burden of proof on that
element from plaintiff to defendants. If the burden of proof the court
was talking about was merely the burden of producing evidence, then
Summers v. Tice contains nothing unusual; everyone knows that the
burden of producing evidence shifts.67 If, on the other hand, the court
shifted the burden of persuasion, then it violated the widely held belief
that the burden of persuasion never shifts."8 In fact, the court did shift
the burden of persuasion on the issue of cause in fact. 9
Because Summers v. Tice was tried to a judge rather than a jury
and because the California Supreme Court used the ambiguous term
"burden of proof" to describe the burden it shifted, some analysis is
required to determine which half of the burden of proof was involved.
The determination is not difficult in jury cases because we know deci-
sions on motions for directed verdicts involve the burden of producing
evidence and decisions about jury instructions involve the burden of
persuasion. There are no instructions in a nonjury case, though, and
absent a description by the judge of his thought processes, it is difficult
to tell whether a finding against a burdened party is based upon the
judge's belief that reasonable persons could not find the party's conten-
tion more likely than not or upon his belief that although reasonable
65. 33 Cal. 2d at 86, 199 P.2d at 4.
66. Id. at 88, 199 P.2d at 5.
67. See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
68. See text accompanying notes 46-55 supra.
69. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTs 704 n.72 (1956), agrees without discussion.
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men could disagree, he does not find the contention more likely than
not.70
A few hints in Summers v. Tice suggest that the court shifted only
the burden of producing evidence. First, defendants argued that there
was not sufficient evidence to show which defendant's negligence caused
the harm.7 1 This refers clearly to the burden of producing evidence. Of
course, defense counsels' perception of the case as argued is but weak
evidence of the court's perception of the case as decided. Secondly, the
court did suggest that evidence was more accessible to the defendants
than to plaintiff72 and analogized the case to and quoted language 73
from Ybarra v. Spangard,74 a res ipsa loquitur case in which the court
said that res ipsa loquitur shifts the burden of producing evidence. Fi-
nally, on the issue of apportionment of damages, the court discussed
whether plaintiff was required to supply evidence for the apportionment
and decided that he was not.75 This, however, is not strong evidence that
Summers is a burden of producing evidence case because normally the
party with the burden of persuasion also initially will have the burden
of producing evidence and plaintiff therefore would not have had to
supply evidence for apportionment regardless of which burden was
placed upon defendants. Even more important is the fact that the princi-
pal issue in the case was causation, so that the division of burdens on
apportionment was tangential, at most, to the case's primary problem.
These small indications that Summers is a burden of producing
evidence case are overwhelmed by evidence pointing in the opposite
direction. First, the evidence at trial included admissions by defendant
Simonson that he caused plaintiff's injuries. As to Simonson, at least,
plaintiff thus carried his burden of producing evidence, and no need
arose to shift it from him. Accordingly, any mention of shifting burdens
must relate to the burden of persuasion. Moreover, the supreme court
noted that the trial court apparently decided not to credit Simonson's
admissions, a decision that it was justified in making. 7 This points
strongly to the conclusion that Summers concerned the burden of per-
suasion since the credibility of the witnesses is to be determined by the
70. The unlikelihood that any aspect of the burden of proof really controls the judge's
decision, see text accompanying notes 56-60 supra, and the close relationship between the burden
of persuasion and the burden of producing evidence, see text accompanying notes 10-12supra, may
well explain the lack of care with which judges differentiate between the 2 burdens in nonjury cases.
71. 33 Cal. 2d at 83, 199 P.2d at 2.
72. Id. at 86, 199 P.2d at 4.
73. Id. at 86-87, 199 P.2d at 4.
74. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
75. 33 Cal. 2d at 88, 199 P.2d at 5.
76. Id. at 84, 199 P.2d at 3.
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trier of fact. The trier of fact is the decision maker concerned with the
burden of persuasion. The judge in his role of trier of law considering
the burden of producing evidence would not have been justified in disbe-
lieving a witness's testimony except in the most extreme cases. Further-
more, Simonson's admissions ought to have carried defendant Tice's
burden of producing evidence. Nonetheless, Simonson and Tice both
lost, again suggesting that the court shifted the burden of persuasion and
not merely the production burden.
The supreme court stated that implicit in the trial court's finding
that the negligence of both defendants caused the harm is the assump-
tion that the court could not ascertain from which defendant's gun the
offending shot came." As we have seen, the whole idea of the civil
burden of persuasion is that the trier is to use it to make decision
possible when he is unable to make up his mind. Indecision is the
furthest imaginable mental state from that involved in a burden of
producing evidence case, in which the judge decides that the evidence is
so clear that all reasonable men must see it one way. Therefore,
Summers v. Tice, by its own language, is a classic example of the
application of the burden of persuasion.7 1
The court in Summers v. Tice, then, violated the dictum that the
burden of persuasion never shifts by shifting that burden on the issue
of cause in fact in a negligence case from plaintiff to defendants. The
result was to permit plaintiff to win a case that the court's idea of sound
policy demanded he win, but also one that established doctrine required
77. Id.
78. A few less significant indications also mark Summers as a burden of persuasion case.
For example, the court quoted Wigmore as saying that in cases like this one each defendant has
the "burden of proving" that the other caused the harm. Id. at 85, 199 P.2d at 3. Once Wigmore
has established the distinction between the 2 parts of the burden of proof, he uses the term "burden
of proof" only when referring to the burden of persuasion. See generally 9 WIGMORE, supra note
30, at 266-498.
Similarly, the court used the term "burden of proof" despite its quotation from Ybarra v.
Spangard, which used the term "burden of producing evidence," thus showing the Summers court's
awareness of the latter term. Moreover, careful courts always distinguish between the 2 burdens.
Some call the burden of persuasion the burden of proof, but no court that distinguishes the 2 calls
the burden of producing evidence the burden of proof. Furthermore, in discussing Ybarra, in which
the court said it had shifted the burden of producing evidence, the Summers court said that Ybarra
concerned whether plaintiff could rely on res ipsa loquitur rather than where the burden of proof
lay, 33 Cal. 2d at 86, 199 P.2d at 4, again suggesting that the Summers court meant burden of
persuasion when it said "burden of proof."
Similarly, the court quoted Professor Carpenter, saying that "there should be a relaxation of
the proof required of the plaintiff," id., quoting Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining
Proximate Cause, Part H. 20 CALIF. L. REv. 396, 406 (1932), which suggests that plaintiff's proof
will no longer have to be so persuasive. Finally, the court said defendants' burden was "to absolve"
themselves, id. at 88, 199 P.2d at 5, which again sounds like something more than merely presenting
some evidence that tended to absolve them.
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him to lose. Defendants were unable to carry the burden imposed upon
them, since no one could prove whose shot hit plaintiff. The obvious
effect of imposing an impossible burden on a party is that he loses the
case; the placement of the burden of proof thus becomes outcome de-
terminative.79 Frequently, the outcome can be determined merely by
manipulating the burden of producing evidence, but in Summers the
lesser manipulation was insufficient because of Simonson's admissions,
so the greater and theoretically forbidden manipulation had to be made.
The practical effect of Summers was, of course, to lay down a new
rule of substantive law: Persons who shoot negligently in the direction
of other persons will be liable for gunshot wounds contemporaneously
suffered by a person in whose direction they fire. Lack of causation may
or may not be an affirmative defense; however, the disregard of Simon-
son's admissions suggests that, if it is a defense, it will be disfavored and
jealously applied.
The rule makes good sense if one believes that fault is the central
criterion of tort liability. A person who negligently shoots in someone
else's direction is culpable. He unreasonably creates the risk that some-
one will be shot. If someone is shot, why should the fortuity of another
person's simultaneous negligence absolve the defendant? Why should
the presence of two negligent persons allow both to escape at the ex-
pense of an innocent injured party? Won't whatever deterrent effect the
law of negligence may have be weakened by insisting on causation in a
Summers type case?
If, however, the primary focus of tort law is not on compensating
the blameless at the expense of the blameworthy, the wisdom of the
Summers result is less clear. In order to assess its economic impact
accurately, for example, one would need fairly detailed information
about the extent and availability of both liability insurance to hunters
and health and accident insurance to hunters and the public generally.
If plaintiffs are more likely to have some form of health and accident
insurance than defendants are to have liability insurance, then Summers
was wrong in terms of minimizing the economic impact of hunting
accidents. If, on the other hand, no one is insured or the odds are better
that at least one defendant will be insured than that plaintiff will be, then
the decision was right, because the plaintiff could collect his entire
award from either defendant-the richer or the one insured-or from
both jointly. 0
79. "[Ilt must be apparent that a complete lack of proof as to a particular element moves
allocation out of the class of a mere handicap and makes it decisive as to the element, and perhaps
as to the case itself." Cleary, supra note 6, at 12, citing Summers.
80. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875 (g) (West Supp. 1972).
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Whether right or wrong, the California court's substantive decision
surely was neither ridiculous nor a decision of which to be ashamed.
Why then did the court not state in a straightforward manner what it
was doing instead of talking about the burden of proof? One can only
guess. Perhaps the court knew that lawyers think in doctrinal terms and
therefore believe in cause-in-fact cases although the court thought in
more functional terms and believed not in cause cases but in gun cases."
The court might not have been sure it was willing to do in a nongun case
what it did in a gun case and thus attempted to create the impression
that it was only tinkering with procedure. If this was the goal, the court
was particularly clumsy in pursuing it. The court's substantial policy
discussion obviously has impact beyond gun cases, and the absence of
limiting language is likely to encourage lawyers to try to analogize their
cases to Summers. In fact, lawyers have sought to have the Summers
rule applied to a wide variety of nongun cases, including situations as
diverse as falls on negligently maintained sidewalks"2 and collisions be-
tween ice trucks and children. 83
Another possible explanation for the court's decision is that the
court wanted to appear to be making a "conservative" decision rather
than striking out in a bold new direction in negligence law. After all,
"mere procedure" may be changed by a court almost at will. A major
change in the substantive law, on the other hand, may be considered
"judicial legislation."
This explanation seems implausible, however, for two reasons:
first, the cases the court cited demonstrated a continuing development
in the law of joint tort feasors that would have permitted the court to
reach its result in a just slightly new and hardly unexpectable way;
secondly, if the court was trying to hide a major decision from the bar
and the commentators, failure was inevitable. In one sense, Summers
is anything but a conservative opinion. As noted, it violated the
shibboleth about the burden of persuasion's never shifting and allowed
a plaintiff to recover despite a clear failure of proof. Only one making
the most insulting assumptions about the legal community reasonably
could expect such a decision to pass unnoticed. In fact, every major
torts casebook has included the case,84 suggesting, at least, that torts
81. Compare C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS ch. 1 (2d ed.
1969) and W. PROSSER & J. WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS ch. 5 (5th ed. 1971), with
L. GREEN, W. PEDRICK, J. RAHL, E. THODE, C. HAWKINS & A. SMITH, CASES ON THE LAW OF
TORTS ch. 1, § 5 (1968) [hereinafter cited as L. GREEN].
82. E.g., Peters v. City of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 419, 429, 260 P.2d 55, 62 (1953).
83. E.g., Hilyar v. Union Ice Co., 45 Cal. 2d 30, 38, 286 P.2d 21, 25 (1955).
84. See, e.g., M. FRANKLIN, INJURIES AND REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW
AND ALTERNATIVES 25, 508 (1971); L. GREEN, supra note 81, at 69, 500, 735; C. GREGORY & H.
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scholars saw something substantively significant in Summers. Every
torts student since 1948 has studied Summers v. Tice, making it un-
likely that the case has totally escaped the notice of the bar.
Was anything accomplished, then, by the California court's proce-
dural smokescreen? I think not, unless confusing the bar is to be consid-
ered an accomplishment. Obviously, "to reject all desirable judicial
accomplishments attained by devious paths would leave the common
law poor indeed. ' 85 Yet deviousness is hardly an independent virtue, and
when a device used to surreptitiously attain a desired end has no inde-
pendent function and exists wholly to facilitate deviousness, one may
well question its value in enriching the common law.86
Professor Fuller has argued that one advantage of the legal fiction
is that it can be removed easily.87 It does not become a "vested interest"
with a group of partisan defenders, and it is more readily displaced than
a construction that appears nonfictitious. Courts that decide cases on
the basis of a pretense may not have discovered the best principle, but
at least they have not obstructed its later discovery.88 However true or
untrue this may be for fictions generally,89 manipulation of burdens of
proof to obtain substantive results in the manner of Summers v. Tice
cannot be defended on this ground. The burden of proof is now so well
established in our system that no one ever considers the need to defend
it." It muddies our law and impedes understanding and reform, not
because it is a fiction, but because it is a fiction that everyone thinks is
real. Even if a court uses burden manipulation as a signal of uncertainty
concerning the merits of substantive change, the technique fails because
the persons receiving the signal do not understand it as such. Because
they believe in burdens of proof, they take the courts at their word, and
because they know they are not supposed to understand burdens of
proof," their inability to understand a decision cast in terms of burdens
does not surprise them. Thus, rather than facilitating development, the
KALVEN, supra note 81, at 12; P. KEETON & R. KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 672 (1971); W. PROSSER & J. WADE, supra note 81, at 271, 379, 747; H. SHULMAN & F.
JAMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 313 (2d ed. 1952).
85. Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REV. 906, 909
(1931).
86. See Cleary, supra note 6, at 24; cf. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation,
1960 Sup. CT. REV. 75, 80 ("[T]o remove candor from one's description of the decisional process
is to strike at the heart of the rule of law.").
87. L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 70-71 (1967).
88. Id.
89. Has the fiction of the reasonable man proved easy to displace and no obstruction to the
improvement of tort law? Those who think the reasonable man lacks partisan defenders and is not
a vested interest might consult any recent publication of the American Trial Lawyers Association.
90. See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
91. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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use of the burden concept as a mask for substantive legal change hinders
progress and confuses judges, lawyers, and the law. Such a use of any
concept is undesirable. Such a use of a concept without independent
validity is inexcusable.
Summers v. Tice is far from the only case that misuses the burden
of persuasion as a mask for substantive legal change. Indeed, every
judicial decision cast in burden of proof terms is essentially a substantive
law decison.12 Decisions in which courts discuss shifting burdens are the
best examples because they demonstrate most dramatically that the
Thayer-Wigmore dogma is followed only as long as it is convenient.
Cases shifting the burden of persuasion arise in many contexts. In
Georgia, for example, the burden of persuasion on the issue of validity
in will contests shifts from the propounder of the will to the caveator
upon proof of the factum of the will, the apparent mental capacity
of the testator, and the voluntary execution of the will. The burden
involved definitely is that of persuasion since the cases concern
the propriety of jury instructions. 3 Similarly, the Supreme Court of
Iowa has held-in In re Estate of Lundvall,94 an action against an
administratrix for an accounting-that a showing by plaintiff of a confi-
dential relationship between deceased and the administratrix in which
the administratrix was the dominant party shifts the burden of persua-
sion to show the absence of fraud onto the defendant administratrix.
Citing negligence cases in which it had shifted the burden of persuasion
on the negligence issue onto defendant common carriers after an initial
showing of negligence by plaintiff passengers,', the Iowa court observed
that "the burden of proof, as distinguished from the burden of going
forward with the evidence, shifts to the defendant in a proper case,"96
and said:
We hold that, in the class of cases discussed in this division, when a confidential
or fiduciary relationship appears and there have been dealings between the parties,
as soon as these things are shown the burden of proof in the sense of burden of
persuasion shifts to the dominant party. . . .The technical arguments which hold
that the burden of proof proper never shifts are overborne by the sound principle
that the dominant factor should be called upon to explain and justify the fairness
of his actions and to prove that the inferior party with whom he dealt had full
freedom and understanding of what he did.
7
92. The federal courts have recognized this in conflict of laws situations. See, e.g., Palmer
v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 622 (1940).
93. Note, Shifting the Burden of Persuasion in Will Contests Involving Undue Influence in
Georgia, 22 GA. B.J. 555 (1960).
94. 242 Iowa 430, 46 N.W.2d 535 (1951).
95. Id. at 437, 46 N.W.2d at 539, citing Crozier v. Hawkeye Stages, 209 Iowa 313, 318, 228
N.W. 320, 322 (1929); Weber v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 175 Iowa 358, 373, 151 N.W. 852, 858
(1915).
96. 242 Iowa at 437, 46 N.W.2d at 539.
97. Id. at 440, 46 N.W.2d at 540.
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The burden-shifting phenomenon also is found in contract-agency
cases, including those in which fiduciary relationships are not determi-
native. For example, once a plaintiff shows that defendant signed a
contract with him, the burden shifts to defendant to show that his prom-
ise was made solely in the capacity of agent for a disclosed principal. 8
In other words, the burden of persuasion on the issue whether defendant
was a party to the contract shifts from plaintiff to defendant.
Courts most frequently engage in decision by burden shifting, how-
ever, in negligence cases-with or without resort to the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. The frequent use of this decision-making technique in
negligence cases probably is attributable in part to the existence of the
special doctrine and in part to the growing dissatisfaction with the doc-
trinal law of negligence.
Thus, the court in Currie v. United States99 affirmed a judgment
for plaintiff in a rear-end collision suit in which the trial court-applying
Maryland law-held that by showing that defendant's brakes failed,
plaintiffs had cast the risk of nonpersuasion on the issues of proper
inspection and sudden failure without warning-i.e. the issue of negli-
gence-onto defendant. Although the defendant government introduced
evidence to show its lack of negligence, the judgment was affirmed
because the trial court remained "unconvinced.""1 ' Similarly, once a
plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence of defendant's negligence to
avoid a directed verdict, the Supreme Court of Vermont has held that
both the burden of producing evidence and the "burden to persuade the
jury that in the face of the danger that prevailed, he exercised the care
and caution that might be expected of reasonable prudence" shift to the
defendant.10'
Numerous res ipsa loquitur cases, of course, involve shifting the
burden of persuasion,0 2 and the question of the procedural effect of res
ipsa loquitur is much mooted." 3
98. Matsko v. Daily, 49 Wash. 2d 370, 301 P.2d 1074 (1956).
99. 312 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1963).
100. Id. at 3.
101. Wright v. Shedd, 122 Vt. 475, 479, 177 A.2d 240, 243 (1962).
102. Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of Proof, 68
U. PA. L. REv. 307, 315-16 (1920); Roberts, supra note 5, at 21; Subrin, Presumptions and their
Treatment under the Law of Ohio, 26 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 204-05 (1965). For a recent case clearly
using res ipsa loquitur to shift the burden of persuasion and citing numerous supporting cases from
its own and other jurisdictions see Weiss v. Axler, 137 Colo. 544, 328 P.2d 88 (1958). But see
Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference-A Discussion of the Louisiana Cases, 4 LA.
L. REv. 70, 89-91 (1941).
103. See generally Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res lpsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. REv.
241 (1936).
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In none of these cases was manipulation of the burden of persua-
sion necessary or even helpful in reaching the desired result. If voluntari-
ness of execution is important to the validity of a will, all a jury need
be told is that the will is valid only if voluntarily executed and that in
determining voluntariness the jury may consider the credibility of the
parties, the relationships among them and between them and the de-
cedent, and the fact that the decedent himself obviously cannot testify.
Although it retains the appearance of jury decision making, the in-
clusion of burden-shifting language in jury instructions merely in-
creases the likelihood of error and provides a reviewing court an extra
chance to reverse a decision with which it disagrees.
The point is even clearer in fiduciary cases like Lundvall.'"' Triers
of fact are not fools: Common sense recognizes that if two persons are
in a confidential relationship in which one is dominant, and if the will
of the dominated party benefits the dominating party, then fraud or
overreaching by the dominant party is likely. The likelihood increases
as the benefit increases or as it entails depriving other obvious benefici-
aries of the dominated person's largess. Why not recognize the incentive
all parties have to produce as much favorable evidence as possible and
let the fact finder decide the issue of fraud without considering who has
the burden of persuasion, much less whether it has shifted? The policy
favoring the shift is a mere recognition of a common-sense view of the
world. When the law and common sense coincide, why confuse the
decision-making process with burdens of proof? To the extent the bur-
den shift may be designed to handicap the fiduciary more than common
sense would, the notion of the burden as an aid to decision making
rather than a disguised rule of substantive law becomes increasingly
absurd. The defendant in Lundvall was forced to prove not only her own
good faith, but also that her dead husband had acted voluntarily, freely,
intelligently, and with full knowledge of all the facts when he made her
joint tenant in much of his property. Because a showing of this nature
always will be impossible, the court in effect decided that fiduciaries
never can benefit from their positions of trust. Rephrased, the rule of
Lundvall becomes simple, clear, unshocking, and a useful guide to fu-
ture fiduciaries.
The point can be made in any context. The law could permit the
jury to exercise common sense in deciding that, absent some reason to
believe the contrary, the signer of a contract signed for himself or
a driver whose faulty brakes caused a rear-end collision was negligent.
104. 242 Iowa 430, 46 N.W.2d 535 (1951).
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Or the law could exceed common sense by invariably imposing liability
on all such signers and drivers. Manipulating the burden of persuasion
achieves nothing otherwise unattainable, confuses the law, and of
course, leads to appellate litigation. And what is accomplished by the
Vermont rule that could not be achieved simply by telling the jury to
decide whether defendant was negligent and to impose liability on him
only if he was?
Burden of persuasion language adds nothing to any of these cases.
Yet the notion that burdens are important to decision making is so
firmly established that commentators occasionally even attempt to ex-
plain important substantive decisions as if they involved mere proce-
dural manipulations. Professor Roberts, for example, has suggested that
Brown v. Kendall,"0 5 the landmark case in the development of the law
of negligence, involved nothing more than a reallocation of the burden
of proof.00 No one can deny that Chief Justice Shaw's Brown opinion
discussed allocation of the burden of proof and made clear that the
plaintiff had to persuade the jury of defendant's negligence in order to
prevail." 7 It is also clear, however, that Brown caused a substantial
reorientation of tort law, and to suggest that the law since Brown has
been to the effect that defendants-are-strictly-liable-regardless-of-fault-
but-they-may-escape-liability-by-showing-unavoidable-accident-
except-that-plaintiff-has-the-burden-of-persuading-the-jury-that-the-
accident-was-not-unavoidable hardly promotes clarity or aids analy-
sis-but then burden of persuasion language never does.
The burden of persuasion does not aid the trier of fact. Rather, it
provides appellate courts an unnecessary device for hiding their substan-
tive decisions. This "benefit" is gained at the cost of substantial confu-
sion and undoubtedly increases significantly the time lawyers must
spend researching cases and judges deciding them. Should we then, at
this late date, think seriously about doing without the burden of persua-
sion altogether? And if we stop using the burden of persuasion concept,
what will become of the burden of producing evidence? And what differ-
ence will that make?
IV. CONCLUSION: ABOLISHING BURDENS OF PROOF
Procedural rules exist for the primary purpose of facilitating the
application of the substantive law." 8 While they may serve other pur-
105. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
106. Roberts, Negligence: Blackstone to Shaw to? An Intellectual Escapade in a Tory Vein,
50 CORNELL L.Q. 191, 203-04 (1965).
107. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) at 297-98.
108. See Cleary, supra note 6, at 5; Michael & Adler, supra note 34, at 1230; Weinstein,
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poses as well," 9 they must never become ends in themselves. When a rule
acquires independent life, it becomes a substantive rule of law that must
be judged by the same standards as other substantive rules.
We have demonstrated already that the burden of persuasion has
no procedural effect "' and that the burden of producing evidence per-
forms an unnecessary function with an inappropriate procedural ef-
fect."' Moreover, the burden of persuasion masks substantive decision
making by permitting appellate courts to change the substantive law
without appearing to do so. Thus it becomes a substantive rule for all
meaningful purposes. When a court makes substantive law by manipu-
lating the burden of persuasion-and not by forthright substantive legal
change-the court creates an intolerable condition in which two con-
flicting substantive rules govern the same situation. Thus, after
Summers v. Tice, factual causation is and is not prerequisite to a plain-
tiff's recovery in a negligence case. This differs from having a rule with
exceptions because the procedural blind hides the rule-exception bound-
ary and permits the court to choose at will what result to reach in a given
case. Moreover, by pretending to make a procedural rather than a
substantive decision, the Summers court decided without consider-
ing-or at least without explicating-the critical question whether caus-
ation always should be prerequisite to recovery for negligence. If not,
when, if ever, should it be prerequisite?
The Summers decision shows one court's belief that causation
should not be required in all cases, that is its belief that the substantive
law which invariably requires causation is wrong because application of
the rule sometimes leads to bad results. Thus the court thought it was
confronted with an example of a problem recognized by Professors
Michael and Adler-a case in which the substantive law can lead to a
correct result only when an incorrect answer is given to a question of
fact."12 That is, the court believed the only way to achieve the correct
result in view of the substantive requirement of causation was to make
the erroneous factual conclusion that both defendants caused plaintiffs
injury. Obviously, if correct factual conclusions lead to wrong results
-or if wrong factual decisions lead to right ones-the substantive law
is wrong."'
Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 COLUM. L. REv.
223, 243 (1966).
109. Michael & Adler, supra note 34, at 1230; Weinstein, supra note 108, at 241.
110. See Part III A supra.
11l. See pp. 1158-59 supra.
112. Michael & Adler, supra note 34, at 1230-31.
113. Id.; see Weinstein, supra note 108, at 243.
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If a court believes a substantive rule is wrong because it sometimes
leads to wrong results, is the court justified in obscuring that fact by
pretending to make a merely procedural decision? Of course no one
would argue that "procedural law should be primarily an instrument for
correcting the substantive law, whose application to particular cases it
governs." '114 Since we already have demonstrated that this is not only
the primary, but the sole function of the burden of persuasion, the
impropriety of using this device should be apparent. One need not reject
all deviousness to reject deviousness for its own sake.1 5
What I have characterized as deviousness, however, others might
denominate the generation of "stop-gap rules""' or a compromise be-
tween achieving procedural justice, or regularity, and justice in a con-
crete case."7 Can the use of the burden of persuasion as a stopgap or
compromise be justified sufficiently to warrant retaining the notion as
part of our law?
Simply stated, the stopgap theory is that the burden of persuasion
provides a useful tool for achieving correct decisions in particular cases
before a court is sure it really wants to change the law. The related
compromise theory recognizes both the desirability of uniformly applied
rules and the possibility that a given rule may lead to bad results in some
cases, even if it usually leads to right ones, and suggests that burden
manipulation offers an opportunity to do justice to individuals without
overturning generally desirable rules.
Neither argument justifies burden manipulation. First, the stopgap-
compromise approach is too simple and unprincipled. In the vernacular,
it is a "cop out." It permits courts to decide hard questions without
considering them fully and deprives the courts of the benefit of outside
analysis that forthright presentation of a problem might engender.
Courts have many other stopgap techniques available: they may, for
example, distinguish cases on their facts, create exceptions to rules, and
develop rules slowly on a case-by-case basis. These techniques permit
the law to grow by recognizing the impossibility of perfect knowledge
and leaving room for backing, filling, and correcting. They all differ
from use of the burden of persuasion, however, by forcing the courts
both to consider the long-range implications of their decisions and to
114. Michael & Adler, supra note 34, at 1231 (emphasis in original).
115. See text accompanying notes 85-86 supra.
116. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion
Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 894 (1968).
117. For a useful discussion of the dichotomy between procedural and concrete justice in an
area closely related to the subject of this Article see Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World,
5 VAND. L. RaV. 324, 331 (1952).
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avoid the temptation of deciding cases on the basis of sympathy or
prejudice.
Secondly, using burdens of persuasion as stopgaps or compromises
on the road to law reform is too confusing. We have discussed at length
the confusion engendered by burden of proof usage. All this can be
avoided by forthright searching for appropriate substantive rules.
Thirdly and most importantly, burden manipulation is unlikely to
lead to correct specific results; thus the weakening and confusion of the
substantive law will not be offset by the promised benefit of justice to
particular litigants. As we have seen, the burden of persuasion is a
device courts use to control juries. But juries are the judicial system's
tool for compromising the substantive law, mitigating its harshness, and
providing stopgap relief when the substantive law changes too slowly.
Because the burden of persuasion is unlikely to affect the jury's deci-
sion,"'8 manipulation by an appellate court can only undermine the
jury's softening function. Thus, if anything, concrete justice becomes
less rather than more likely to be achieved by continuing to use the
burden of persuasion device, and all that is accomplished by its contin-
ued existence is the fouling of the substantive law. We should stop
assigning and manipulating burdens of persuasion.
Once burdens of persuasion are eliminated, burdens of producing
evidence fall of their own weight. The latter are a function of the for-
mer,"' and without burdens of persuasion, burdens of producing evi-
dence make little sense: they serve no real function and sometimes cause
parties to lose lawsuits because of an attorney's tactical misjudgment. 2"
I propose the total rejection of the concept of burden of proof and
the substitution for it of a privilege to open the proof, a motion to
produce more evidence, and a style of jury instructions that will speak
solely in terms of the substantive law.12' This change will simplify the
law, provide an improved chance for substantive law improvement with-
out affecting the fact-finding function of courts, and make it harder for
easy cases to make bad law.
118. See Part III A supra.
119. See note I I supra and accompanying text.
120. See pp. 1158-59 supra.
121. See Lawson, The Law of Presumptions: A Look at Confusion, Kentucky Style, 57 Ky.
L.J. 7. 14-15 (1968).
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